Απ' ότι φαίνεται αυτό που γράφεις δημήτρη είναι και το σενάριο που ζμπρώχνουν οι ΗΠΑμερικάνοι.

White House, Egypt Discuss Plan for Mubarak’s Exit
WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is discussing with Egyptian officials a proposal for President Hosni Mubarak to resign immediately and turn over power to a transitional government headed by Vice President Omar Suleiman with the support of the Egyptian military, administration officials and Arab diplomats said Thursday.

[spoiler=...:1rudzwbt]Even though Mr. Mubarak has balked, so far, at leaving now, officials from both governments are continuing talks about a plan in which Mr. Suleiman, backed by Lt. Gen. Sami Enan, chief of the Egyptian armed forces, and Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, the defense minister, would immediately begin a process of constitutional reform.

The proposal also calls for the transitional government to invite members from a broad range of opposition groups, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood, to begin work to open up the country’s electoral system in an effort to bring about free and fair elections in September, the officials said.

Senior administration officials said that the proposal was one of several options under discussion with high-level Egyptian officials around Mr. Mubarak in an effort to persuade the president to step down now.

They cautioned that the outcome depended on several factors, not least Egypt’s own constitutional protocols and the mood of the protesters on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities.

Some officials said there was not yet any indication that either Mr. Suleiman or the Egyptian military was willing to abandon Mr. Mubarak.

Even as the Obama administration is coalescing around a Mubarak-must-go-now posture in private conversations with Egyptian officials, Mr. Mubarak himself remains determined to stay until the election in September, American and Egyptian officials said. His backers forcibly pushed back on Thursday against what they viewed as American interference in Egypt’s internal affairs.

“What they’re asking cannot be done,” one senior Egyptian official said, citing clauses in the Egyptian Constitution that bar the vice president from assuming power. Under the Constitution, the speaker of Parliament would succeed the president. “That’s my technical answer,” the official added. “My political answer is they should mind their own business.”

Mr. Mubarak’s insistence on staying will again be tested by large street protests on Friday, which the demonstrators are calling his “day of departure,” when they plan to march on the presidential palace. The military’s pledge not to fire on the Egyptian people will be tested as well.

The discussions about finding a way out of the crisis in Cairo take place as new questions are being raised about whether American intelligence agencies, after the collapse of the Tunisian government, adequately warned the White House and top lawmakers about the prospects of an uprising in Egypt.

During a Senate hearing on Thursday, both Democrats and Republicans pressed a senior Central Intelligence Agency official about when the C.I.A. and other agencies notified President Obama of the looming crisis, and whether intelligence officers even monitored social networking sites and Internet forums to gauge popular sentiment in Egypt.

“At some point it had to have been obvious that there was going to be a huge demonstration,” said Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who is chairwoman of the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence.

She said that intelligence agencies never sent a notice to her committee about the growing uprising in Egypt, as is customary in the case of significant global events.

Stephanie O’Sullivan, the C.I.A. official, responded that the agency had been tracking instability in Egypt for some time and had concluded that the government in Cairo was in an “untenable” situation. But, Ms. O’Sullivan said, “we didn’t know what the triggering mechanism would be.”

Because of the fervor now unleashed in Egypt, one Obama administration official said, Mr. Mubarak’s close aides expressed concern that they were not convinced that Mr. Mubarak’s resignation would satisfy the protesters.

In an interview with Christiane Amanpour of ABC News, Mr. Mubarak said that he was “fed up” with being president but that he could not step down for fear of sowing chaos in the country.

“The worry on Mubarak’s part is that if he says yes to this, there will be more demands,” said Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. “And since he’s not dealing with a legal entity, but a mob, how does he know there won’t be more demands tomorrow?”

A number of high-level American officials have reached out to the Egyptians in recent days. While administration officials would not offer details of the alternatives that were being discussed, they made it clear that their preferred outcome would be for Mr. Suleiman to take power as a transitional figure.

Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. spoke by phone to Mr. Suleiman on Thursday, the White House said in a statement, urging that “credible, inclusive negotiations begin immediately in order for Egypt to transition to a democratic government that addresses the aspirations of the Egyptian people.”

Mr. Biden’s phone call came after a mission by Mr. Obama’s private emissary, Frank G. Wisner, was abruptly ended when Mr. Mubarak, angry at Mr. Obama’s toughly worded speech on Tuesday night, declined to meet with the envoy a second time, officials said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has made three calls since the weekend to Egypt’s powerful defense minister, Field Marshal Tantawi, who served on the coalition’s side in the Persian Gulf war of 1991.

Pentagon officials declined on Thursday to describe the specifics of the calls but indicated that Mr. Gates’s messages were focused on more than urging the Egyptian military to exercise restraint.

Officials familiar with the dialogue between the Obama administration and Cairo say that American officials have told their Egyptian counterparts that if they support another strongman to replace Mr. Mubarak — but without a specific plan and timetable for moving toward democratic elections — Congress might react by freezing military aid to Egypt.

On Thursday, the Senate passed a resolution calling on Mr. Mubarak to begin the transfer of power to an “inclusive, interim caretaker government.”

Anthony H. Cordesman, an expert on the Egyptian military at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said that a transition government led by Mr. Suleiman and the military, with pledges to move toward democratic elections, was in his mind “the most probable case.” But he said the administration had to proceed with extreme caution.

“Everybody working this issue knows that this is a military extremely sensitive to outside pressure,” Mr. Cordesman said.

Even as the Obama administration has ratcheted up the pressure on Egypt, it has reaffirmed its support for other Arab allies facing popular unrest.

The White House released a statement saying that Mr. Obama called President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen on Wednesday to welcome Mr. Saleh’s recent “reform measures” — the Yemeni president promised not to run again in 2013.

And on Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called King Abdullah II of Jordan to say that the United States looked forward to working with his new cabinet — recently announced — and to underline the importance of the relationship between Jordan and the United States.

Philip J. Crowley, the State Department spokesman, declined to say whether Mrs. Clinton had enlisted King Abdullah in an effort to ease out Mr. Mubarak. But Mr. Crowley praised the king for responding to the unrest in Jordan.

“He’s doing his best to respond to this growing aspiration,” Mr. Crowley said. “And we appreciate the leadership he’s shown.”[/spoiler:1rudzwbt]

Στο μεταξύ το jazeera απεκατέστησε απευθείας εικόνα από την πλατεία Tahrir.
Ο κόσμος έχει πυκνώσει πάρα πολύ. Πολύ περισσότερος από τις τελευταίες δύο μέρες των διαρκών συγκρούσεων με τους παρακρατικούς, καθώς ετοιμάζονται για τη 'Μέρα της Αποχώρησης'
Ακόμα συρρέουν χιλιάδες.

Πολλοί δημοσιογράφοι βρίσκονται ακόμα κρατούμενοι (περίπου 30) ή και αγνοούνται (περίπου 5).

Η παρουσία του στρατού έχει ισχυροποιηθεί, και ως αριθμός και ως έλεγχοι.

ΤΟ 'σχέδιο' των ΗΠΑ μάλλον βρίσκει σύμφωνους και τους εξεγερμένους που φαίνεται να προβάλλουν κάτι τέτοιο :

Mubarak should step down and delegate his power to the vice president to start a dialogue with a newly formed opposition coalition, observed by a neutral UN delegation, to (a) establish a constitutional assembly to amend articles 77, 78 and 88 of the Egyptian constitution to enable Egyptians to be candidates for presidency of the republic. The president should be from the people, elected by the people and cannot run for more than two terms, (b) the state of emergency in effect for over 25 years should be lifted, (c) establish monitory bodies for future elections from the judicial system, (d) establish a national coalition body to monitor the transition during the next 6 months, (e) organise elections according to international standards, (f) permanently set guidelines for establishment of legal political parties that are not vetted by the national democratic party but by an independent neutral body, (g) establish the rule of law and independent judiciary, (h) elect a new parliament representative of all parties as the current parliment is based on forged elections.

Ο χρήστης mjacob έγραψε:
Απ' ότι φαίνεται αυτό που γράφεις δημήτρη είναι και το σενάριο που ζμπρώχνουν οι ΗΠΑμερικάνοι.

White House, Egypt Discuss Plan for Mubarak’s Exit
WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is discussing with Egyptian officials a proposal for President Hosni Mubarak to resign immediately and turn over power to a transitional government headed by Vice President Omar Suleiman with the support of the Egyptian military, administration officials and Arab diplomats said Thursday.

Ναι οι ΗΠΑ το σπρωχνουν. Διαβαζα στους NY Times (αυτο το αρθρο που εβαλες) για συναντησεις του Σουλεϊμαν με Τζο Μπαιντεν και Χιλαρι Κλιντον και οτι μια απο τις προτασεις ηταν αυτη.

Λοιπόν, αν επιβεβαιωθούν οι φόβοι των 'αντιδραστικών' και μεθαύριο οι Αιγύπτιες τρώνε ξύλο στο δρόμο επειδή πήγαν στη λαϊκή χωρίς συνοδό και με ακάλυπτα πρόσωπα, οι καταναλωτές αλκοόλ μαστιγώνονται δημοσίως και οι μοιχές λιθοβολούνται στα στάδια, πόση χαρά θα κάνουν οι επαναστάτες;
Ή αν τοποθετηθεί μια κυβέρνηση μαριονετών των ΗΠΑ, στο στυλ του Ιράκ, ίσως και υπό 'διεθνή' εγγύηση (ξέρει από αυτά η Αίγυπτος, τουλάχιστον από την εποχή του Ίντεν), τι θα ακούμε;

Δε σε πιανω βρε μανοσκ. Θες να πεις κατι ? Για καν'το ταληρακια

ΥΓ
Στον Λιβανο η Χεζμπολα κατεβαινει στους δρομους με Χριστιανους και Δρουζους, στην Υεμενη (υποτιθεμενη (εντος ή εκτος '') βαση της Αλ Καιντα) κατεβαινουν στις διαδηλωσεις με πορτραιτα του Τσε και οχι του Μπιν Λαντεν, στην Αιγυπτο μουσουλμανοι διαδηλωτες προσευχονται και χριστιανοι φτιαχνουν αλυσιδα προστασιας τους απο επιθεση παρακρατικων . Που βλεπεις φονταμενατλισμο ?

Αν κατέβαιναν με πορτραίτα του Λάντεν, θα δινόταν εντολή να βγει ο στρατός και να τους θερίσει. Είπαμε, άλλο να ετοιμαστεί μια διαφορετική κατάσταση κι άλλο να ανατραπεί το κοινωνικό στάτους, με επικεφαλής μουλάδες.
Δεν είναι τόσο ηλίθιοι οι φονταμενταλιστές να βγουν μπροστά από την αρχή - θα στοχοποιηθούν και θα χάσουν πολλούς από τους σημερινούς διαδηλωτές, που απλώς θέλουν διαφορετική κατάσταση από αυτήν του (στρατοκρατούμενου) καθεστώτος Μουμπάρακ.
Ο ισλαμισμός έχει γερά θεμέλια στην Αίγυπτο και χωρίς ισχυρή κρατική παρουσία θα πολεμήσει για την επικράτησή του με κάθε μέσο εκμεταλλευόμενο το κενό εξουσίας - όπως δηλαδή συμβαίνει σήμερα στο Ιράκ. Κάποια στιγμή ο νέος Πρωθυπουργός ή Πρόεδρος θα περάσει νόμους που θα οδηγούν σε μια ελαφριά -αρχικά- εκδοχή της Σαρία (λίγο μαντήλα, λίγο ισλαμικό οικογενειακό δίκαιο, λίγο βαρύτερες ποινές για εγκλήματα 'ηθικής' κλπ). Και στην επόμενη αναμπουμπούλα, θα αρχίσει η τρομοκρατία κατά των άπιστων.
Εκτός αν γίνει η Αίγυπτος προτεκτοράτο με ξένα στρατιωτικά σώματα να καραδοκούν δίπλα στο Σουέζ.

Τώρα δλδ δεν είναι προτεκτοράτο [με την έννοια ότι παίρνουν τεράστιες επιχορηγήσεις ετησίως] και δεν υπάρχει μόνιμη ξένη στρατιωτική δύναμη να καραδοκεί στην περιοχή;

[ασχετο]

0949: A rocket-propelled grenade has been fired at state security headquarters in the Egyptian town of El-Arish, setting the building on ablaze, AFP reports.

Ίσως όσο προτεκτοράτο ήταν και η Ελλάδα πριν την ΕΟΚ. Άλλο όμως αυτό κι άλλο φάση τύπου Ιράκ.

@ μανοσκ

Στην 'πολιτικη' σου εκτιμηση ('Κάποια στιγμή ο νέος Πρωθυπουργός ή Πρόεδρος θα περάσει νόμους που θα οδηγούν σε μια ελαφριά -αρχικά- εκδοχή της Σαρία (λίγο μαντήλα, λίγο ισλαμικό οικογενειακό δίκαιο, λίγο βαρύτερες ποινές για εγκλήματα 'ηθικής' κλπ). Και στην επόμενη αναμπουμπούλα, θα αρχίσει η τρομοκρατία κατά των άπιστων.') δεν εχει εννοια να απαντησω γιατι δεν ξερεις (εκτος κι' αν βλεπεις το μελλον σε γυαλινη σφαιρα) και δεν ξερω (αν και μασησα φυλα) ποια θα ειναι η εξελιξη των πραγματων.

Το ερωτημα ειναι , τι θα επρεπε να κανουν οι Αιγυπτιοι ?

Όταν ξεκινάς μια επανάσταση ή εξέγερση, πρέπει να έχεις πλάνο για το τι θα ακολουθήσει. Πχ στην Ελλάδα ήθελαν να διώξουν τους Οθωμανούς (περίεργα πράγματα ) και αργότερα να διώξουν τους Βαυαρούς ή να αποκτήσουν Σύνταγμα. Στην Αγγλία να περιορίσουν τις εξουσίες του Βασιλιά υπέρ του Κοινοβουλίου. Στη Ρουμανία να καταργήσουν το κομμουνιστικό καθεστώς Τσαουσέσκου υπέρ ενός δημοκρατικού πολιτεύματος. Στην Αλβανία να διώξουν τον Μπερίσα με τις πυραμίδες του.
Στην Αίγυπτο τι ακριβώς θέλουν; Να φύγει ο Μουμπάρακ υπέρ τίνος ή ποιας κατάστασης; Πρέπει να δούν τι περιμένει από πίσω. Υποψιάζομαι ότι περιμένουν οι Ισλαμιστές με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται, όχι η ελευθερία που προσδοκούν κάποιοι απλώς αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες. Εξίσου πιθανή όμως είναι μια στρατιωτική δικτατορία τύπου Σαντάμ ή Καντάφι, που θα πνίξει τους Ισλαμιστές στο αίμα. 'Δημοκρατία' όμως και ελευθερία σαν αυτή που ξέρουμε εμείς -θεωρώ ότι- έχει λίγες πιθανότητες να υπάρξει.

**
Edit:
να κι άλλος με κρυστάλλινη σφαίρα**
http://news.in.gr/world/article/?aid=1231077289

Podcast Ηχητικό: Οι Πάνος Χαρίτος και Πέτρος Παπακωνσταντίνου μας μιλάνε από το Κάιρο την ημέρα της αποχώρησης του Hosni Mubarak

Νομίζω έχει ενδιαφέρον

Ο χρήστης manosk έγραψε:
Στην Αίγυπτο τι ακριβώς θέλουν; Να φύγει ο Μουμπάρακ υπέρ τίνος ή ποιας κατάστασης; Πρέπει να δούν τι περιμένει από πίσω. Υποψιάζομαι ότι περιμένουν οι Ισλαμιστές με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται, όχι η ελευθερία που προσδοκούν κάποιοι απλώς αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες. Εξίσου πιθανή όμως είναι μια στρατιωτική δικτατορία τύπου Σαντάμ ή Καντάφι, που θα πνίξει τους Ισλαμιστές στο αίμα. 'Δημοκρατία' όμως και ελευθερία σαν αυτή που ξέρουμε εμείς -θεωρώ ότι- έχει λίγες πιθανότητες να υπάρξει.

Παλι δεν απαντας στο τι θα επρεπε να κανουν οι Αιγυπτιοι.

Το καθεστως στην Αιγυπτο ηταν τυπου στρατιωτικης δικτατοριας. Στερηση ελευθεριας εκφρασης, τεραστια ανεργια (γυρω στο 40% στους νεους) , πολυ χαμηλοι μισθοι , πολυ χαμηλο βιοτικο επιπεδο , με εξαθλιωμενους που ζουν σε παραγκουπολεις (μεχρι και σε νεκροταφεια) .

Ελευθερια , δημοκρατια και μια καλυτερη ζωη θελουν.

o manosky ήθελε 5ετές πλάνο απ τους εξεγερμένους

Ο χρήστης dimitris_f έγραψε:

Στην Αίγυπτο τι ακριβώς θέλουν; Να φύγει ο Μουμπάρακ υπέρ τίνος ή ποιας κατάστασης; Πρέπει να δούν τι περιμένει από πίσω. Υποψιάζομαι ότι περιμένουν οι Ισλαμιστές με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται, όχι η ελευθερία που προσδοκούν κάποιοι απλώς αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες. Εξίσου πιθανή όμως είναι μια στρατιωτική δικτατορία τύπου Σαντάμ ή Καντάφι, που θα πνίξει τους Ισλαμιστές στο αίμα. 'Δημοκρατία' όμως και ελευθερία σαν αυτή που ξέρουμε εμείς -θεωρώ ότι- έχει λίγες πιθανότητες να υπάρξει.

Παλι δεν απαντας στο τι θα επρεπε να κανουν οι Αιγυπτιοι.

Το καθεστως στην Αιγυπτο ηταν τυπου στρατιωτικης δικτατοριας. Στερηση ελευθεριας εκφρασης, τεραστια ανεργια (γυρω στο 40% στους νεους) , πολυ χαμηλοι μισθοι , πολυ χαμηλο βιοτικο επιπεδο , με εξαθλιωμενους που ζουν σε παραγκουπολεις (μεχρι και σε νεκροταφεια) .

Ελευθερια , δημοκρατια και μια καλυτερη ζωη θελουν.

Τα ίδια ήθελαν και το 1979 στο Ιράν

Για τη 'δημοκρατία' δεν είμαι σίγουρος, σε όλη αυτή την περιοχή δεν ξέρουν καν τι σημαίνει (sad but true). Και στο Ιράκ ο παπάρας ο Μπους 'δημοκρατία' τους πρόσφερε και είδαμε πόσο καλά τα πάνε...

Και καμιά τοπική άποψη περί του πως κύλησαν τα πράγματα.
Για όποιον ενδιαφέρεται να τα διαβάσει, έχει και καλές αναφορές στο πως κινήθηκαν συγκεκριμένες δυνάμεις.

Early Days of the Protests
With demonstrations having gone into a second day and the levels of violence, especially by the forces of order, rising Cairenes are considering what will happen over the weekend which begins tomorrow, Friday. There have been calls for renewed and intensified demonstrations and a nearly frantic effort last night to spread the word over Twitter and Facebook amid fears that the government would shut down access to those sites as well as its decision to ban any further demonstrations. These fears seem plausible, at least judging by my inability last night to access either Facebook or my email account registered outside the borders of Egypt.
[spoiler=...:ljz43czq]“Are we in the middle of a revolution?” friends have asked. None of us have any experience living through one and in fact most Egyptians have had nothing but experience with repressive regimes, albeit of varying levels of ferocity and expertise over the past 50 years. If by revolution we mean the involvement of broad sectors of the population in a political movement against a wounded state which seeks to transform relations of sociability and economic power, then we are far from one. If, however, as political scientists who worked in the 1930s believed revolutions involve higher levels of uncertainty then Egypt is certainly on the cusp of one. Whatever else is happening at least for now no one knows what tomorrow will bring, a notion that is at once exhilarating and frightening. And there is a widespread sense that, as the columnist Amr Shobaki put it today, a threshold has been passed so that a new reality—whose outlines are far from clear but which will include a citizenry less fearful and more willing to undertake activity—is coming into view.

Although there have been large demonstrations in downtown Cairo which have been dispersed by tear gas, rubber bullets, and clubs, the most intense conflicts appear to be elsewhere. Suez, port city and a site of domestic and even international contestation (during the wars with Israel) appears to have seen the most severe violence. There are reports of attacks on the headquarters of the ruling party and the use of Molotov cocktails as well as violent fighting between the police and the demonstrators in the largely industrial city on the Canal. There is little doubt that what the government fears most is that the political confrontations in Cairo which are probably still limited to the young and the liberal somehow should become connected to the widespread discontent among the industrial workforce whose strikes and protests dominated the headlines a couple of years ago. Indicative of the levers of control that the government retains and which, certainly differentiate Egypt from Tunis, is that the leader of the official and state-controlled trade union movement, Hussein Magawer, today announced that his organization will monitor the workers’ situation, “hour by hour” to prevent them from showing solidarity with the protestors. The official union movement has long been part of the repressive apparatus of the state; it remains to be seen whether local activists and wildcat leaders have either the resources or the will to challenge the government’s control in so central an area of economic and social life. Should they choose to do and do it successfully it will clearly be mark a significant step forward.

The opposition press continues to explain events in terms that undermine not only the government but also much of the traditional political opposition. The Muslim Brothers appear, for the moment, like deer caught in the headlights of a truck moving down on them. They refused to participate in the demonstrations until they were forced to by young activists more or less at the last minute. They realized, correctly as it turns out, that the government would use this as yet another opportunity to lay the blame on them and then excuse its repression by claiming it was saving the country from the threat of Islamic extremism. They then announced that they were participating like other citizens. And the government has arrested more or their leaders and activists and tried to link them to acts of violence. Yet, as they attempt to evade government blame and repression they inevitably appear to be more fearful, less well organized, and also less connected to popular outrage than in the past. Muhammad al-Baradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and once hoped-for candidate for the presidency was outside the country (evidently in an undisclosed location) during the initial demonstrations which has probably further tarnished his image as a possible leader. Liberal political leaders have taken the opportunity to enunciate some stirring demands that echo popular discontent. Leaders of the Wafd party and the Democratic party for Change have called for a creation of a popular government and resignation of the provincial councils. The antagonism of the Christian clerical hierarchy to the demonstrations has probably not helped their image and the official Islamic hierarchy inside and around the Azhar has been silent. Of course official leaders expect the government to resolve the situation in its favor and will, no doubt, find plausible excuses should the demonstrations force it to back down.

What is completely unclear is what kind of disagreements or splits there are within the ruling elite itself. Some members of the National Democratic party have made conciliatory, if not wholly believable, statements on television. Citizens, they assert, have the right to protest and question the government. The problem, as many Egyptians have noted, is that these rights enshrined in the Egyptian constitution do not seem to have been very prominent in either the discourse or the decisions of the ruling party until this week when demonstrators forced the issue.

A popular question is “why now?” Since no one, apart perhaps from the more or less unknown activists who called the initial “Day of Rage” demonstrations seems to have foreseen events remotely like what have occurred it is necessary to note the ad hoc nature of the answer. I am sure that, especially outside Egypt, experts are explaining why now and what next. Here things look less certain.

Nevertheless talking to friends there are a few things to keep in mind. Having allowed some space to the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in the 2005 parliamentary elections the government’s decision to eliminate all opposition in 2010 seems to have been egregious and demeaning. It was one thing to prevent people from voting and falsify the voting while leaving a certain margin for opposition. It was something else to willfully eliminate the opposition while intensifying the falsification. Widespread as vote-tampering was (and has been for decades) there was something especially shocking about a widely circulated video clip from last fall that showed an election official turning out falsified ballots in a polling station with a dispatch and gusto rarely seen in the activities of civil servants here.

The sense that the institutions of the state are not only repressive—which after all they have been at least since Nasser if not in fact during the socalled liberal era—but simply no longer function with any degree of effectiveness also weighs on people. The government was caught napping when the countries of the upper Nile basin decided, last spring, to challenge the existing allocation of war to Egypt’s possible detriment. The government responded to “swine flu” by exterminating Egypt’s porcine population which caused significant damage to the environment (the pigs helped to dispose of garbage by eating it), elements of the Christian community (which owned them), and reaped additional scorn from the intelligentsia (which realized that, despite its name “swine flu” does not pass from pigs or pork to people so that the destruction of the animal population did not make humans safer). The government, despite its aggressive opposition to Islamic extremism, hasn’t been able to protect the Christian community from several outrageous acts of murderous assault. The attack on an Alexandrian church this year caused more death but the one in the south last year that involved a drive-by shooting appears to have been linked not to religious gangsters but to the electoral politics of the ruling party itself.

The new media played some role in all of this. It is now possible within hours, if not minutes, to see gruesome pictures of citizens beaten to death by the police (Khalid Said), vote tampering, massive crowds in the main square in downtown Cairo, and vicious satires of the ruling elite. It is also possible for people to connect with each other quickly and relatively securely. But it is also true that this is, while certainly not a free or liberal polity, one in which there has been significantly greater freedom of expression and access to the external world than in the past. Thirty years ago the secret police could (and did) round up almost anybody for a night of interrogation or several years in jail or a concentration camp. Thirty years ago if you wanted any news except that given by the government press, you sat in an internal room of the apartment (so no neighbors would hear) and you listened to BBC or the Radio Monte Carlo Arabic service turned down as low as possible while still being audible. Today you turn on the television and watch Al-Jazeera, Dream, or CNN and whatever you miss intrepid reporters in the opposition printed press will bring you in the morning.

Connectivity, itself often identified with the new media, also matters. As in much of the third world the paucity of landlines brought the mobile phone into massive use. Cell phone stores and cell phones abound. It’s not necessary to be particularly literate or numerate to use them and, perhaps even more important than Facebook and Twitter, they encourage oral rather than written interaction. Since social scientists have long tended (probably wrongly) to associate modernity and upheaval with literacy, it may come to be a shock to them as they need to begin to think more about orality, rumor, and face to face (however mediated through electronic mechanisms) interactions.

So far the government has tried to minimize the effect of the past days’ events. Although it has, quite brutally, cleared the downtown Cairo squares in the late evenings and responded with even more force to events outside the capital, it has resisted imposing a curfew. It has also refrained from unleashing massive violence. Clearly the government is and has to be worried about the effect of a loss of confidence (among its supporters) and the continued loss of fear (among its opponents). There is much broader public opinion and the government is far more dependent on society than in the past. One simple, and perhaps to American ears, not very meaningful example is the effect of the last days on the Egyptian stock market and the value of the pound: both have falling dramatically. The fear that investors might abstain from the Egyptian economy or that people are beginning to send money abroad was not very compelling for the government when it occurred in 1954 (the last time there was a functioning stock market during a period of massive unrest). However this is not an economy that can do without links to the international economy any more nor can the government reverse the years of privatization and hope to re-install a nationalized industrial system. That is a road that has pretty clearly shown itself to be unworkable.

And a curfew? The government can send 30,000 troops to contain 30,000 demonstrators in the center of the capital and it has. But can it actually enforce a curfew on a conurbation of 14 million people. People have been stocking up on food just in case but, again, this is a society where regular food shopping remains a fact of life and where most shopping begins at 6 pm and socializing routinely begins at 8 pm. Those with long memories in the government may recall the late President Sadat’s attempt to “discipline the streets” in 1980 by forcing European closing hours on stores. Despite using riot police and elements of the army, the government gave up the attempt outside of the center of Cairo within days and abandoned the effort there within weeks. What if the government imposed a curfew and nobody obeyed it?[/spoiler:ljz43czq]

Και μια λίγο διαφορετική εκτίμηση

A Slow Motion Coup
The tumultuous events of the last day have left everybody here reeling as much as they seem to have the outside world. Yesterday around this time it seemed as if the peaceful protests had succeeded in forcing Mubarak onto the defensive and that he would be on his way out. Now I don’t think it’s so clear. What I do think is that the future of Egypt for the next generation is going to be decided in the next few days but that it may be months before we truly come to see even the bare outlines of that decision. And with the future of Egypt comes a significant fraction of the future of the Arab world, not to mention the lives of hundreds of millions of people who really deserve more than they’ve gotten from the callous military regimes that have ruled most of the region for the last 60 years.

[spoiler=...:ljz43czq]I had a couple of frantic calls from friends yesterday evening, at least some of whom spent the night more or less trapped in downtown while the pro-Mubarak thugs attacked peaceful protestors in Midan al-Tahrir. By the morning when I was able to contact them again they were safe, although evidently at least five people lost their lives and hundreds were wounded, many severely. I’m not going to discuss the violence and cruelty of the attacks; they’ve been documented and described and viewed and re-viewed. I want to make a couple of other points that are clear to everybody on the ground here but may not be quite so obvious outside Egypt. The first is that many of the pro-government demonstrators streamed into the square from the north across the 15th of May Bridge and down the Corniche which means they had to pass by extremely narrow checkpoints manned by the army. Even on the best days last week it was very difficult to move down the Nile Corniche because the tanks and concrete barriers often left gaps of only 18 inches or two feet through which to pass. So they could easily have been closed off at any moment had the troops been given orders. Other thugs probably came across the Sixth of October bridge, slightly to the south. This 8-lane bridge provides almost literally an artery into the heart of downtown Cairo and is essentially open event his afternoon. What there are, however, are another set of army checkpoints, reinforced with barbed wire, that could also have been employed to prevent any movement into the square as soon as the order was given. The very best construction you can put on the events is that the Egyptian army had no order to intervene; the more likely one is that it had explicit orders not to intervene. Indeed the local Arabic language press has reported anti-government demonstrators pleading with the soldiers to prevent the brutality and being asked if they were being requested to fire on Egyptians. So the claim that the army will not fire on Egyptians turns out, in the end, to have been something of a trick. The army didn’t fire on the demonstrators but neither did it prevent their armed tormentors from attacking them.

I walked down to the area above the Midan al-Tahrir this afternoon. I had heard stories that some of the government’s thugs were looking for foreigners so I walked slowly. I was surprised that there were no checkpoints on the approaches to the bridge or on the bridge itself especially given earlier reports that the army had cleared the bridge of government supporters and established itself there.

Looking down in the area just to the north of the Egyptian museum was a chaotic scene that was seemed like something out of Dante’s Inferno. Cars were parked on the bridge and adjacent freeway and more than a thousand people were watching the violence continuing to unfold beneath them. You could see people hitting each other, wrestling, and screaming. And not more than a hundred yards from the roiling bodies were enlisted men and their officers standing outside their armored personnel carriers with hardly a care in the world. Occasionally the crowd would seem to boil up over barriers and stairs and a few people would escape like errant molecules of steam. And then suddenly there was the loud “pop” of gunfire and echoes and then a dozen more shots while the spectators hurried away from the barrier at the edge of the bridge to the safety of the other side and slowly returned back. I had no camera and there was certainly no positive role I could play besides having witnessed what I saw. So I walked to the opposite side of the freeway and there I could see soldiers doing what they had evidently been ordered to do. They had stopped each of the four or five vehicles that had somehow made it into the area of the square while the searched each vehicle, its baggage, and its operator’s identity with exceptional care. What they had been ordered to ensure, I am guessing, is that no car bombs explode in the area; what they had not been ordered to do was to ensure otherwise the security of the Egyptian citizens. And they carried out their orders.

How this will all end is still anybody’s guess, but for what it’s worth let me set down mine. Much of the speculation about Mubarak’s own personality and his unwillingness to let go is probably accurate enough. It also seems increasingly clear that the government as a whole (and not just Mubarak) are wagering that with sufficient violence and instability they can convince Egyptians that a order is better than a vacuum.

But I think there are a few other points worth making. A few analogies have been widely deployed and discredited: Iran 1979, Iran 2009, Eastern Europe 1991. I think all of these analogies can be fruitful even if in some sense they’re all wrong. Egypt is Egypt but thinking about times and places can help us expand our sense of what’s going on. Too much time of too may pundits has been spent trying to be “right” and too little trying to be either thoughtful or helpful. I have a couple of other analogies all of which, I admit, betray my own somewhat doubtful sense at the moment.

The first analogy that strikes me as apposite is France 1968 when a huge student movement in Paris expressed a generation’s worth of social, economic and cultural change that the DeGaulle government tried to ignore and then repress. Repression and fear of change worked together to defeat the student movement on its own terms, and DeGaulle actually was returned to power with an even larger majority than he had previously had before the strike. Nevertheless within a year he was gone and within a bit more than a decade France had its first Socialist government since the 1930s. Nothing quite symbolizes, I think, the disconnect between the government and society than the decision to deploy troops in front of the television station last weekend. Control of the tv and radio were crucial to the success of military coups in the past, but this government was not confronting a military coup. It was confronting, albeit not for the first time in Egyptian history, massive spontaneous popular protest. So it may be that Mubarak will win in the short run without necessarily being able to prevent the transformation of the government over a somewhat longer period. That, at any rate, is one hopeful scenario.

Two other analogies are more deeply rooted in Egyptian history. Contemporary Egyptian historical narrative and the emergence of sense of shared citizenship (and citizenship was one of the key concepts of the last week) came from the massive, spontaneous and largely peaceful demonstrations of 1919 against British Occupation. There are many dimensions to this narrative, including that of the equality of Muslim and Copt in a single national community, that I hope to write about later. For the moment, however, there are two competing concepts of revolution in modern Egyptian history. One, rooted in 1919, is what we have seen in the past week: a spontaneous, largely non-violent, and massive protest against arbitrary political authority by the population. What the Facebook page, We Are All Khaled Said, provided (among others) to Egyptians in its exposure of the moral failures and repugnant actions of the regime, the massive petition campaign in favor of independence provided in 1918. It set the stage. The British arrest and deportation of the independence leaders in 1919 touched off the revolution just as the fake election and the example Tunisia set of the events of January 2011. Ultimately in 1919 the British gave way, although again, only after a protracted political struggle. This particular pattern of Egyptian history was repeated again in the 1935 student uprising, chronicled in part in the famous novel, Al-Ard or This Egyptian Land.

The limitations of the analogy show what may be a weakness today. In 1919 and 1936, Egypt possessed an active, aware, and capable political elite that was ready to enter the parliamentary system, the ministries, and other locations of power and to establish the institutions of governance. Egypt today has a political movement as broad and powerful as in the past. What it lacks today is not politically astute figures or people with an understanding of politics; what it lacks is a political elite with the stature and readiness of a Saad Zaghlul or even an Ismail Sidqi—that is, to use more familiar names, without a Nelson Mandela or aVaclav Havel.

The other meaning of revolution, closely connected with the Free Officers’ movement and Gamal Abdel Nasser is that of a military coup. This was no revolution: it took power away from an imperfectly elected semi-liberal government and placed it in the hands of army officers where it has, through a series of partial transformations, remained until today. In the process it destroyed many institutions and organizations rooted in society and replaced them with institutions controlled by the state—trade unions, business associations, women’s organizations, and so forth. Popular as this regime was for ending British rule and the monarchy, it also used the same kind of physical violence that we have seen in the streets today to attack opponents as diverse as the head of the highest administrative courts, the elderly attorney Abdel Razzak Sanhoury and workers who engaged in strikes.

What seems to me to be at stake is therefore not just power and not just the legitimacy of a person but indeed the legitimacy of an entire institutional legacy and the very notion of how the Egyptian people might control their own destiny and exercise sovereignty. One concept of revolution is that sovereignty not only emanates from the people but that they can and will exercise it themselves when necessary. The government must, in short, bend to their wishes. The other concept, rooted in the exigencies of military hierarchy, is that popular sovereignty is simply the narrative backdrop for the army’s control of the entire society. These two contradictory approaches have not been placed in such stark opposition before now. What seems to me therefore is that, for the moment, not only Mubarak but those around him are determined that the Egyptian people not be able to show that they have influenced, or indeed determined, the course of Egyptian history and the state. They want not only to punish the people for disobedience but to teach them a lesson about their impotence. What is happening in Midan al-Tahrir is designed to make the return of the army to its role as supreme arbitrator not only acceptable to the population but desirable.

Bringing the tanks into the street, including into the area in front of the television station is more than a reflex from the middle decades of the 20th century which is how I had thought of it earlier. It is an indication, I think, that what we are watching is not for the moment the end of Mubarak but the unfolding, very deliberately, of a military coup in slow motion. Some of the miscreants from the “old regime” are already being rounded up as are many of the old regime’s critics in the human rights movement. They will all be packed off and the army will, once more, assure stability in Egypt. And that, as long as they can, that Egyptians in their plurality and infinite difference have as little say as possible in deciding what its future will be.[/spoiler:ljz43czq]

Οι Στρατιωτικοι θα αναλαβουν την διακυβερνηση μεχρι τις εκλογες.... αυτο ειναι το πιο πιθανο με τις λιγωτερες απωλειες για τον κοσμο της αιγυπτου Ο χαριτος και ο Παπακωνσταντινου εχουν τςελειως αντιθετες προβλεψεις..

Ο χρήστης nass έγραψε:

Στην Αίγυπτο τι ακριβώς θέλουν; Να φύγει ο Μουμπάρακ υπέρ τίνος ή ποιας κατάστασης; Πρέπει να δούν τι περιμένει από πίσω. Υποψιάζομαι ότι περιμένουν οι Ισλαμιστές με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται, όχι η ελευθερία που προσδοκούν κάποιοι απλώς αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες. Εξίσου πιθανή όμως είναι μια στρατιωτική δικτατορία τύπου Σαντάμ ή Καντάφι, που θα πνίξει τους Ισλαμιστές στο αίμα. 'Δημοκρατία' όμως και ελευθερία σαν αυτή που ξέρουμε εμείς -θεωρώ ότι- έχει λίγες πιθανότητες να υπάρξει.

Παλι δεν απαντας στο τι θα επρεπε να κανουν οι Αιγυπτιοι.

Το καθεστως στην Αιγυπτο ηταν τυπου στρατιωτικης δικτατοριας. Στερηση ελευθεριας εκφρασης, τεραστια ανεργια (γυρω στο 40% στους νεους) , πολυ χαμηλοι μισθοι , πολυ χαμηλο βιοτικο επιπεδο , με εξαθλιωμενους που ζουν σε παραγκουπολεις (μεχρι και σε νεκροταφεια) .

Ελευθερια , δημοκρατια και μια καλυτερη ζωη θελουν.

Τα ίδια ήθελαν και το 1979 στο Ιράν

Για τη 'δημοκρατία' δεν είμαι σίγουρος, σε όλη αυτή την περιοχή δεν ξέρουν καν τι σημαίνει (sad but true). Και στο Ιράκ ο παπάρας ο Μπους 'δημοκρατία' τους πρόσφερε και είδαμε πόσο καλά τα πάνε...

Και τι σημαινει το 'Τα ίδια ήθελαν και το 1979 στο Ιράν' ? Ασε που εχουν περασει 30τοσα χρονια απο το 79. Οι κοινωνικες εξεγερσεις δεν εχουν προκαθορισμενη πορεια/εξελιξη. Μπορει να σου κατσικωθουν και τιποτα φονταμενταλιστες (εξαρταται και απο τους ιδιους τους Αιγυπτιους).

Δεν λεει κατι το οτι η καταληξη μπορει να ειναι η ιδια ή παρομοια με αυτη στο Ιραν (ναι μπορει και να ειναι, το εχω γραψει αλλωστε).

Είναι φανερή η αγωνία των εραστών του ΔΝΤ να υποβιβάσουν την εξέγερση και να χρωματίσουν τους εξεγερμένους σαν φοντμενταλιστικα πρόβατα που θα μαντρώσει ο νέος Χομεϊνί. Δυστυχώς τα πρόβατα ξυπνάνε ένα ένα και απλά θα πρέπει να αποφασίσετε με ποια μεριά θα είστε.
Ανάμεσα σε όλα τα άλλα κάνει τεραστία εντύπωση που κανένας δεν τολμάει να σχολιάσει τους 'θετικους' οικονομικους δεικτες της Αιγύπτου που αποδεικνύουν για πολλοστή φορα οτι ο καπιταλισμός δεν χρειάζεται κανένα δημοκρατικό παραμύθι για να ανθίσει-και να μαραζώσουν οι άνθρωποι.

Και σου ξαναλέω. Μου αρέσει που έχεις εξασφαλίσει ποιός θα φάει το ξύλο. Αν ρωτήσεις αυτή τη στιγμή κάποιον στην Αθήνα (δείγμα) ποιόν θα ήθελε να σπάσει στο ξύλο θα σου πει πρώτα τον Πάγκαλο, μετά κάποιον από τους εργατοπατέρες των ΜΜΜ και μετά κάπου θα αναφέρει και τον Ρίζο Ρίζο ( ). Επειδή όμως την ώρα του ξύλου τον Πάγκαλο δεν θα τον δει πουθενά μάντεψε ποιός θα τις μαζέψει...
Ο κόσμος στην Αίγυπτο πεθαίνει για κάτι που εμείς το έχουμε εντελώς κλασμένο. Διεκδικούν ελεύθερες εκλογές τη στιγμή που εμείς προτιμήσαμε αποχή...
Οι αγρότες το πιασαν το υπονοούμενο και δεν τόλμησαν φέτος να κλείσουν δρόμους. Το ξύλο θα ήταν πολύ και άγριο και δεν θα ήταν από τα ΜΑΤ.
Κάτσε να πέσουν και 1-2 πρόστιμα στο Μετρό σε κόσμο που δεν θα ακύρωσε εισητήριο επειδή δεν θα τον άφησε κάποιος επαναστάτης και να δεις μετά αν θα τολμάει κανείς να κλείσει ακυρωτικό.

Κατά τ' άλλα ευχηθείτε μην προκύψει κανάς Χομεϊνής Νο2 στην Αίγυπτο γιατί ΤΗΝ ΠΟΥΤΣΙΣΑΜΕ. Ο Saladin στο Σαββίδη ανέφερε ότι το να ανέβουν οι αδελφοί Μουσουλμάνοι δεν σημαίνει αυτόματα ότι θα γίνει η Αίγυπτος Ιράν. Μακάρι...

Εισαι τελειως εκτος θεματος.Ποιος τους χεζει τους παγκαλους και τα κομματοσκυλα.>Ο χρήστης manosk έγραψε:

Μάλλον το δικό σου κρανίο είναι ακόμα εν τρικυμία.Το δικό μου κάθε μέρα που περνάει καθαρίζει από την σαβούρα.